PasoLeati
Madmaxista
El G4M "Betty" era un aparato de la marina imperial. El ejército japonés no tenía G4Ms (no hubieran sabido volarlos, porque entre otras cosas los aviones de la marina japonesa tenían el mando de gases "al revés" que los aviones del ejército japonés - otra taza de frenopático
).Jarto ilustrativo artículo escrito en 1952 por el almirante Fukudome, que estaba al mando de la aviación japonesa (marina y ejército) en Formosa en Octubre 1944:
Strategic Aspects of the Battle Off Formosa, by Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome - US Naval Institute
"... For many years the Japanese Army had built up its armament with a view to fighting the Russian Army in Manchuria and had organized and trained all its forces along that line. Army planes had been exclusively assigned to the duty of cooperating with ground combat forces. The Army’s policy in building up aviation armament had been to maintain as many short-range tactical aircraft as possible ...
... Later, as the Chinese war continued, the Japanese Army found it necessary to launch strategic bombers against targets in the interior of the continent. Thereupon, the Army began to manufacture a heavy bomber, called Type-Ki-81*** after the model of the Navy’s then middle-sized torpedo bomber. This new Army bomber, if equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks, could carry out a shuttle-bombing of 800 miles radius.
Although the Army bombers of this type had become available for actual battle missions by the middle of the Pacific War, the Army refused to use them for the defense of the Marianas. It was obvious to all of us that the loss of these strategic islands would result in fatal exposure of the Japanese lifeline to relentless enemy attack. It was also obvious that the defense of the Marianas depended mainly upon the use of land-based planes, the Army’s as well as the Navy’s. But the Army, deeply committed to its activities on the continent, did not divert even a single plane for use in the defense of the Marianas, whereas the Navy threw into the Marianas all her first-line air power then available.
After the fall of the Marianas, however, the Army changed its policy. In the light of rapid changes in the war situation, the Army realized that even Army planes had to be diverted to operations on the ocean frontiers. The Army authorities began thinking of training for oceanic missions with the use of the Type-Ki-81’s, which were the only Army planes capable of participating effectively in the new mission ...
... the Army flyers were given only two to six months of training for their sea mission. By our naval standards, therefore, we could not consider that the Army flyers in the TAF (Taiwan Attack Force) had completed their initiation course for night attack training. Especially deplorable was their ability in recognition. Without exaggeration, I have to confess that there was virtually none among the Army flyers who could tell exactly which ship was of what type ..."
"... Our fighters were nothing but so many eggs thrown at the stone wall of the indomitable enemy formation. In a brief one-sided encounter, the combat terminated in our total defeat ..."
*** De forma típica en las interacciones marina/ejército japonés, aquí Fukudome se hace la innombrable un lío. En realidad se esta refiriendo al Mitsubishi Ki-67 Hiryu del ejército.
