Tuttle
Madmaxista
The cult of home ownership is dangerous and damaging
By Adam Posen
The US and UK should ditch their obsessions with residential property, writes Adam Posen
The cult of home ownership is dangerous and damaging - FT.com
You would think that the residential property bubble and subsequent crisis of the past decade would make people leery of widespread home ownership, and governments reluctant to pump it up. Yet, here we are again.
Despite the continuing fiscal tightening, the UK coalition government is pressing on with its “Help to Buy” scheme and the US Congress continues its unquestioning protection of the home mortgage interest tax deduction. This is the economic policy equivalent of incurring the individual and social costs of an obesity epidemic while still subsidising maize and beef production – but maybe more fixable.
Things do not have to be this way in the Anglo American economies. Policies to increase home ownership do not necessarily improve the supply or distribution of housing, as the UK experience demonstrates, and often works against it. The OECD’s Better Life Index shows that no relationship exists between a country’s home-ownership levels and its average housing satisfaction and quality. And there is no iron law that higher-income economies must have higher rates of home ownership: Mexico, Nepal and Russia all have home-ownership rates of more than 80 per cent, while the French, German and Japanese rates are 30-40 percentage points lower. The US and the UK rates sit between them at about 65 to 70 per cent.
The real issue, however, is the harm done by efforts in the UK and US to maintain and increase that rate. Start with the distortion to savings behaviour that mortgage subsidies and high loan-to-value ratios encourage. For many American and British households, their home equity is their primary financial asset. In other words, we incentivise middle-class households to leverage the bulk of their savings into a highly volatile, difficult to price asset, which is subject to disaster risk both idiosyncratic (fire, tree falling on the roof) and general (flood, local industry closure), and which – based on the economic fundamentals – should return at best the average rate of local wage and population growth.
Average individuals cannot calculate, let alone reasonably project, the running costs and financial risks of their housing investment as opposed to renting and putting their savings in more stable, liquid assets. But they constantly hear the misleading mantra that renting “is throwing money away” while incurring mortgage debt “builds equity”. So their savings go into housing, which puts them to little productive purpose as compared to investing in new businesses, infrastructure or research and development – or, for that matter, compared to rental housing that provides the same services but costs less (when individuals are not paying for the option on artificial capital gains that goes with ownership). Overinvesting in bricks and mortar is a losing proposition for the households involved – but also for the economy as a whole.
The mass movement of voters’ savings into an inherently risky asset also creates demands on policy makers to provide capital gains on housing that their constituents otherwise would not receive. As a result, we get a combination of regulatory measures, local stimulus plans, subsidies to property lending and bias towards inflation that promote housing bubbles. And it is housing booms and busts that wreak the most havoc on economies of all bubbles, including through the concomitant destruction of banking systems. This was evident from history even before our current crisis, as my colleague Tomas Hellebrandt and I have shown.
But if the disasters in the UK and US were not enough, recent events, including overheated property markets in China and Turkey, further illustrate the point. This danger alone would be justification enough to having governments lean against housing price swings, as opposed to pursuing policies that promote real estate speculation by individuals.
The costs of excessive home ownership, however, go even further. The promotion of such ownership is fundamentally regressive. It perpetuates inherited wealth and subsidies of middle-class children. The accumulation of housing wealth benefits those simply lucky enough to have had grandparents who were homeowners. Any policies to promote younger people “getting on the property ladder” will disproportionately benefit those fortunate children who have been given savings, have parental co-signers and can show stable prior residency. They come at the cost of spending that money elsewhere, say on housing credits for the poor. They also perpetuate an influential lobby to protect mortgage debt and housing assets from taxes, whether while living in the asset or passing it on to family members. Like all favouritism to the children of the relatively rich, this discourages the development of new talent and competition, and thus is economically harmful.
Home ownership also directly discourages economic flexibility. In new research, my colleague David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald of Warwick university have found that rises in the home-ownership rate in a US state are a precursor to eventual greater rises in unemployment. Home ownership damages employment through three powerful channels: decreasing levels of labour mobility, increasing commuting times and diminishing creation of businesses. Their evidence suggests that the housing market can produce negative “externalities” on the labour market.
Of course, in a free society, people who want to own homes and have the means should be able to purchase them, just as they would any other luxury item. But our governments do not need to subsidise that purchase. Increasing home ownership does not increase housing, least of all for the poor. Increasing home ownership in the US and Britain beyond what the free market would generate does, however, distort capital allocation, put a large share of household savings at unnecessary risk, impede mobility, and creates a powerful lobby for government tras*fers to the wealthy. And it creates housing bubbles to devastating effect.
When we are attempting large fiscal consolidations, could we at least start by ending these destructive housing policies rather than cutting useful investment and progressive programmes?
Traducción de google
By Adam Posen
The US and UK should ditch their obsessions with residential property, writes Adam Posen
The cult of home ownership is dangerous and damaging - FT.com
You would think that the residential property bubble and subsequent crisis of the past decade would make people leery of widespread home ownership, and governments reluctant to pump it up. Yet, here we are again.
Despite the continuing fiscal tightening, the UK coalition government is pressing on with its “Help to Buy” scheme and the US Congress continues its unquestioning protection of the home mortgage interest tax deduction. This is the economic policy equivalent of incurring the individual and social costs of an obesity epidemic while still subsidising maize and beef production – but maybe more fixable.
Things do not have to be this way in the Anglo American economies. Policies to increase home ownership do not necessarily improve the supply or distribution of housing, as the UK experience demonstrates, and often works against it. The OECD’s Better Life Index shows that no relationship exists between a country’s home-ownership levels and its average housing satisfaction and quality. And there is no iron law that higher-income economies must have higher rates of home ownership: Mexico, Nepal and Russia all have home-ownership rates of more than 80 per cent, while the French, German and Japanese rates are 30-40 percentage points lower. The US and the UK rates sit between them at about 65 to 70 per cent.
The real issue, however, is the harm done by efforts in the UK and US to maintain and increase that rate. Start with the distortion to savings behaviour that mortgage subsidies and high loan-to-value ratios encourage. For many American and British households, their home equity is their primary financial asset. In other words, we incentivise middle-class households to leverage the bulk of their savings into a highly volatile, difficult to price asset, which is subject to disaster risk both idiosyncratic (fire, tree falling on the roof) and general (flood, local industry closure), and which – based on the economic fundamentals – should return at best the average rate of local wage and population growth.
Average individuals cannot calculate, let alone reasonably project, the running costs and financial risks of their housing investment as opposed to renting and putting their savings in more stable, liquid assets. But they constantly hear the misleading mantra that renting “is throwing money away” while incurring mortgage debt “builds equity”. So their savings go into housing, which puts them to little productive purpose as compared to investing in new businesses, infrastructure or research and development – or, for that matter, compared to rental housing that provides the same services but costs less (when individuals are not paying for the option on artificial capital gains that goes with ownership). Overinvesting in bricks and mortar is a losing proposition for the households involved – but also for the economy as a whole.
The mass movement of voters’ savings into an inherently risky asset also creates demands on policy makers to provide capital gains on housing that their constituents otherwise would not receive. As a result, we get a combination of regulatory measures, local stimulus plans, subsidies to property lending and bias towards inflation that promote housing bubbles. And it is housing booms and busts that wreak the most havoc on economies of all bubbles, including through the concomitant destruction of banking systems. This was evident from history even before our current crisis, as my colleague Tomas Hellebrandt and I have shown.
But if the disasters in the UK and US were not enough, recent events, including overheated property markets in China and Turkey, further illustrate the point. This danger alone would be justification enough to having governments lean against housing price swings, as opposed to pursuing policies that promote real estate speculation by individuals.
The costs of excessive home ownership, however, go even further. The promotion of such ownership is fundamentally regressive. It perpetuates inherited wealth and subsidies of middle-class children. The accumulation of housing wealth benefits those simply lucky enough to have had grandparents who were homeowners. Any policies to promote younger people “getting on the property ladder” will disproportionately benefit those fortunate children who have been given savings, have parental co-signers and can show stable prior residency. They come at the cost of spending that money elsewhere, say on housing credits for the poor. They also perpetuate an influential lobby to protect mortgage debt and housing assets from taxes, whether while living in the asset or passing it on to family members. Like all favouritism to the children of the relatively rich, this discourages the development of new talent and competition, and thus is economically harmful.
Home ownership also directly discourages economic flexibility. In new research, my colleague David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald of Warwick university have found that rises in the home-ownership rate in a US state are a precursor to eventual greater rises in unemployment. Home ownership damages employment through three powerful channels: decreasing levels of labour mobility, increasing commuting times and diminishing creation of businesses. Their evidence suggests that the housing market can produce negative “externalities” on the labour market.
Of course, in a free society, people who want to own homes and have the means should be able to purchase them, just as they would any other luxury item. But our governments do not need to subsidise that purchase. Increasing home ownership does not increase housing, least of all for the poor. Increasing home ownership in the US and Britain beyond what the free market would generate does, however, distort capital allocation, put a large share of household savings at unnecessary risk, impede mobility, and creates a powerful lobby for government tras*fers to the wealthy. And it creates housing bubbles to devastating effect.
When we are attempting large fiscal consolidations, could we at least start by ending these destructive housing policies rather than cutting useful investment and progressive programmes?
Traducción de google
El culto a la propiedad de la vivienda es peligroso y perjudicial
Por Adam Posen
Los EE.UU. y el Reino Unido deberían deshacerse de sus obsesiones con la propiedad residencial, escribe Adam Posen
Se podría pensar que la burbuja inmobiliaria residencial y la posterior crisis de la década pasada harían las personas desconfían de propiedad de una vivienda amplia y gobiernos reacios a pump it up. Sin embargo, aquí estamos de nuevo.
A pesar del ajuste fiscal permanente, el gobierno de coalición del Reino Unido está presionando con su "ayuda para comprar" plan y el Congreso de EE.UU. continúa su protección incondicional de la hipoteca deducción interés hogar. Esta es la política económica equivalente a incurrir en los costos individuales y sociales de una epidemia de obesidad al tiempo que subsidiar el maíz y la producción de carne de vacuno - pero tal vez más corregible.
Las cosas no tienen por qué ser así en las economías de Anglo American. Las políticas destinadas a aumentar la propiedad de la vivienda no necesariamente mejoran el suministro o la distribución de la vivienda, ya que la experiencia del Reino Unido demuestra, ya menudo trabaja contra ella. Índice vida mejor de la OCDE demuestra que no existe ninguna relación entre los niveles de propiedad de vivienda de un país y su satisfacción por medio de la vivienda y calidad. Y no hay una ley de hierro que las economías de altos ingresos deben tener tasas más altas de propiedad de la vivienda: México, Nepal y Rusia tienen las tasas de propiedad de vivienda de más de 80 por ciento, mientras que las tasas francés, alemán y japonés son 30-40 porcentaje puntos más bajos. El Reino Unido las tasas de EE.UU. y se sientan entre ellos en aproximadamente 65 a 70 por ciento.
El verdadero problema, sin embargo, el daño causado por los esfuerzos del Reino Unido y EE.UU. para mantener y aumentar esa tasa. Comience con la distorsión al comportamiento de los ahorros que los subsidios hipotecarios y las altas tasas de préstamo-a-valor animan. Para muchos hogares estadounidenses y británicos, la capital de la casa es su activo financiero principal. En otras palabras, nosotros incentivamos los hogares de clase media para aprovechar la mayor parte de sus ahorros en una alta volatilidad, difícil de precios de los activos, que está sujeta al riesgo de desastres tanto peculiar (fuego, árbol que cae en el techo) y general (inundaciones, locales cierre de la industria), y que - en base a los fundamentos económicos - deben volver en el mejor de la tasa promedio de los salarios locales y el crecimiento demográfico.
Promedio de los individuos no pueden calcular, por no hablar razonablemente proyecto, los gastos de funcionamiento y los riesgos financieros de su inversión en vivienda en lugar de alquilar y poner sus ahorros en activos más estables y líquidos. Pero ella sólo escucha el mantra engañosa que el alquiler "es tirar el dinero", mientras que incurrir en la deuda hipotecaria "construye equidad". Así que sus ahorros van en la carcasa, lo que les sitúa a poca utilidad productiva en comparación con la inversión en nuevos negocios, la infraestructura o la investigación y el desarrollo - o, para el caso, en comparación con la vivienda de alquiler que ofrece los mismos servicios, pero cuesta menos (cuando los individuos son no pagar por la opción sobre las plusvalías artificiales que pasa con la propiedad). Invertir demasiado en ladrillos y el mortero es un caso perdido para los hogares involucrados -, sino también para la economía en su conjunto.
El movimiento de masas de los ahorros de los votantes en un activo inherentemente riesgoso también crea demanda de los responsables políticos para proporcionar ganancias de capital sobre la vivienda que sus componentes de otra manera no recibirían. Como resultado, se obtiene una combinación de medidas regulatorias, planes de estímulo locales, los subsidios a los préstamos inmobiliarios y el sesgo hacia la inflación que promueven las burbujas inmobiliarias. Y es boom de la vivienda y caídas que causan los mayores estragos en las economías de todas las burbujas, incluso mediante la destrucción concomitante de los sistemas bancarios. Esto fue evidente en la historia, incluso antes de nuestra crisis actual, como mi colega Tomas Hellebrandt y he demostrado.
Pero si los desastres en el Reino Unido y EE.UU. no eran suficientes, los últimos acontecimientos, incluidos los mercados inmobiliarios sobrecalentados en China y Turquía, ilustrar el punto. Sólo este peligro sería justificación suficiente para tener gobiernos apoyan en oscilaciones de los precios de la vivienda, frente a la aplicación de políticas que promueven la especulación inmobiliaria de los individuos.
Los costes de propiedad excesiva casa, sin embargo, van más allá. La promoción de esta propiedad es fundamentalmente regresiva. Se perpetúa la riqueza y los subsidios de los niños de clase media heredada. La acumulación de la riqueza inmobiliaria beneficia a aquellos que simplemente la suerte de haber tenido abuelos que eran propietarios. Las políticas de promoción de las personas más jóvenes "que consiguen en la escalera de la propiedad" se benefician de manera desproporcionada a los niños afortunados que han recibido de ahorro, tienen los padres co-firmantes y pueden mostrar residencia previa estable. Vienen a costa de gastar ese dinero en otra parte, dicen los créditos de vivienda para los pobres. También perpetúan un lobby influyente para proteger la deuda hipotecaria y de activos de vivienda de los impuestos, ya sea mientras vivía en el activo o tras*mitirla a sus familiares. Como todo el favoritismo a los hijos de los relativamente ricos, esto dificulta el desarrollo de nuevos talentos y la competencia, y por lo tanto es económicamente perjudicial.
Propiedad de la vivienda también desalienta directamente flexibilidad económica. En la nueva investigación, mi colega David Blanchflower y Andrew Oswald, de la Universidad de Warwick han encontrado que los aumentos en la tasa de vivienda en propiedad en un estado de EE.UU. son un precursor de eventuales mayores incrementos en el desempleo. Inicio titularidad daños empleo a través de tres canales de gran alcance: la disminución de los niveles de movilidad laboral, el aumento de los tiempos de viaje y la disminución de creación de empresas. Su evidencia sugiere que el mercado inmobiliario puede producir "externalidades" negativas en el mercado laboral.
Por supuesto, en una sociedad libre, la gente que quiere tener casa propia y tienen los medios deben ser capaces de comprarlos, tal como lo haría con cualquier otro artículo de lujo. Pero nuestros gobiernos no deben subsidiar la compra. El aumento de propiedad de la vivienda no se incrementa la vivienda, y mucho menos para los pobres. El aumento de propiedad de la vivienda en los EE.UU. y Gran Bretaña, más allá de lo que el libre mercado generaría, sin embargo, distorsiona la asignación de capital, puso una gran parte del ahorro de las familias en situación de riesgo innecesario, impiden la movilidad y crea un poderoso grupo de presión de las tras*ferencias del gobierno a los ricos. Y crea burbujas de la vivienda con un efecto devastador.
Cuando estamos tratando grandes consolidaciones fiscales, podríamos al menos empezar por poner fin a estas políticas destructivas de la vivienda en lugar de recortar programas progresivos inversión útil y?