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Este es un artículo publicado allá por 2015 una vez ocurrieron los hechos del Maidán y Crimea, escrito por uno de los mejores autores de geopolítica de la actualidad, John Mearsheimer.
Destaco un extracto en concreto, pero sirve para dejar claro que todo se sabia hace años, que USA sabía donde se metía, y la estrategia de presión que ha ejercido USA sobre Rusia.
No digo que USA no tenga unos objetivos y unos intereses que por lo que tiene que luchar, pero queda clara la situación que ha llevado a este punto.
Don't Arm Ukraine
By JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER FEB. 8, 2015
The Ukraine crisis is almost a year old and Russia is winning. The separatists in
eastern Ukraine are gaining ground and Russia’s president, Vladimir V. pilinguin, shows
no signs of backing down in the face of Western economic sanctions.
Unsurprisingly, a growing chorus of voices in the United States is calling for
arming Ukraine. A recent report from three leading American think tanks endorses
sending Kiev advanced weaponry, and the White House’s nominee for secretary of
defense, Ashton B. Carter, said last week to the Senate armed services committee, “I
very much incline in that direction.”
They are wrong. Going down that road would be a huge mistake for the United
States, NATO and Ukraine itself. Sending weapons to Ukraine will not rescue its
army and will instead lead to an escalation in the fighting. Such a step is especially
dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and is seeking to
defend a vital strategic interest.
There is no question that Ukraine’s military is badly outgunned by the
separatists, who have Russian troops and weapons on their side. Because the
balance of power decisively favors Moscow, Washington would have to send large
amounts of equipment for Ukraine’s army to have a fighting chance.
But the conflict will not end there. Russia would counterescalate,
taking away
any temporary benefit Kiev might get from American arms. The authors of the think
tank study concede this, noting that “even with enormous support from the West,
the Ukrainian Army will not be able to defeat a determined attack by the Russian
military.” In short, the United States cannot win an arms race with Russia over
Ukraine and thereby ensure Russia’s defeat on the battlefield.
Proponents of arming Ukraine have a second line of argument. The key to
success, they maintain, is not to defeat Russia militarily, but to raise the costs of
fighting to the point where Mr. pilinguin will cave. The pain will supposedly compel
Moscow to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and allow it to join the European
Union and NATO and become an ally of the West.
This coercive strategy is also unlikely to work, no matter how much punishment
the West inflicts. What advocates of arming Ukraine fail to understand is that
Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in
Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground, even if it means absorbing huge costs.
Great powers react harshly when distant rivals project military power into their
neighborhood, much less attempt to make a country on their border an ally. This is
why the United States has the Monroe Doctrine, and today no American leader
would ever tolerate Canada or Mexico joining a military alliance headed by another
great power.
Russia is no exception in this regard. Thus Mr. pilinguin has not budged in the face
of sanctions and is unlikely to make meaningful concessions if the costs of the
fighting in Ukraine increase.
Upping the ante in Ukraine also risks unwanted escalation. Not only would the
fighting in eastern Ukraine be sure to intensify, but it could also spread to other
areas. The consequences for Ukraine, which already faces profound economic and
social problems, would be disastrous.
The possibility that Mr. pilinguin might end up making nuclear threats may seem
remote, but if the goal of arming Ukraine is to drive up the costs of Russian
interference and eventually put Moscow in an acute situation, it cannot be ruled out.
If Western pressure succeeded and Mr. pilinguin felt desperate, he would have a
powerful incentive to try to rescue the situation by rattling the nuclear saber.
Our understanding of the mechanisms of escalation in crises and war is limited
at best, although we know the risks are considerable. Pushing a nucleararmed
Russia into a corner would be playing with fire.
Advocates of arming Ukraine recognize the escalation problem, which is why
they stress giving Kiev “defensive,” not “offensive,” weapons. Unfortunately, there is
no useful distinction between these categories: All weapons can be used for attacking
and defending. The West can be sure, though, that Moscow will not see those
American weapons as “defensive,” given that Washington is determined to reverse
the status quo in eastern Ukraine.
The only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not militarily.
Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to recognize that fact, as she has said
Germany will not ship arms to Kiev. Her problem, however, is that she does not
know how to bring the crisis to an end.
She and other European leaders still labor under the delusion that Ukraine can
be pulled out of Russia’s orbit and incorporated into the West, and that Russian
leaders must accept that outcome. They will not.
To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the
West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO.
It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should
explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the table, and emphasize
that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United
States and its allies should also work with Mr. pilinguin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a
goal that is clearly in everyone’s interest.
It is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern Ukraine and that Kiev
regain control over that region. Still, the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk should
be given substantial autonomy, and protection for Russian language rights should be
a top priority.
Crimea, a casualty of the West’s attempt to march NATO and the European
Union up to Russia’s doorstep, is surely lost for good. It is time to end that
imprudent policy before more damage is done — to Ukraine and to relations
between Russia and the West.
John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of
Chicago, is the author of “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.”
A version of this opedappears in print on February 9, 2015, in The International New York Times.
Destaco un extracto en concreto, pero sirve para dejar claro que todo se sabia hace años, que USA sabía donde se metía, y la estrategia de presión que ha ejercido USA sobre Rusia.
No digo que USA no tenga unos objetivos y unos intereses que por lo que tiene que luchar, pero queda clara la situación que ha llevado a este punto.
Don't Arm Ukraine
By JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER FEB. 8, 2015
The Ukraine crisis is almost a year old and Russia is winning. The separatists in
eastern Ukraine are gaining ground and Russia’s president, Vladimir V. pilinguin, shows
no signs of backing down in the face of Western economic sanctions.
Unsurprisingly, a growing chorus of voices in the United States is calling for
arming Ukraine. A recent report from three leading American think tanks endorses
sending Kiev advanced weaponry, and the White House’s nominee for secretary of
defense, Ashton B. Carter, said last week to the Senate armed services committee, “I
very much incline in that direction.”
They are wrong. Going down that road would be a huge mistake for the United
States, NATO and Ukraine itself. Sending weapons to Ukraine will not rescue its
army and will instead lead to an escalation in the fighting. Such a step is especially
dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and is seeking to
defend a vital strategic interest.
There is no question that Ukraine’s military is badly outgunned by the
separatists, who have Russian troops and weapons on their side. Because the
balance of power decisively favors Moscow, Washington would have to send large
amounts of equipment for Ukraine’s army to have a fighting chance.
But the conflict will not end there. Russia would counterescalate,
taking away
any temporary benefit Kiev might get from American arms. The authors of the think
tank study concede this, noting that “even with enormous support from the West,
the Ukrainian Army will not be able to defeat a determined attack by the Russian
military.” In short, the United States cannot win an arms race with Russia over
Ukraine and thereby ensure Russia’s defeat on the battlefield.
Proponents of arming Ukraine have a second line of argument. The key to
success, they maintain, is not to defeat Russia militarily, but to raise the costs of
fighting to the point where Mr. pilinguin will cave. The pain will supposedly compel
Moscow to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and allow it to join the European
Union and NATO and become an ally of the West.
This coercive strategy is also unlikely to work, no matter how much punishment
the West inflicts. What advocates of arming Ukraine fail to understand is that
Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in
Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground, even if it means absorbing huge costs.
Great powers react harshly when distant rivals project military power into their
neighborhood, much less attempt to make a country on their border an ally. This is
why the United States has the Monroe Doctrine, and today no American leader
would ever tolerate Canada or Mexico joining a military alliance headed by another
great power.
Russia is no exception in this regard. Thus Mr. pilinguin has not budged in the face
of sanctions and is unlikely to make meaningful concessions if the costs of the
fighting in Ukraine increase.
Upping the ante in Ukraine also risks unwanted escalation. Not only would the
fighting in eastern Ukraine be sure to intensify, but it could also spread to other
areas. The consequences for Ukraine, which already faces profound economic and
social problems, would be disastrous.
The possibility that Mr. pilinguin might end up making nuclear threats may seem
remote, but if the goal of arming Ukraine is to drive up the costs of Russian
interference and eventually put Moscow in an acute situation, it cannot be ruled out.
If Western pressure succeeded and Mr. pilinguin felt desperate, he would have a
powerful incentive to try to rescue the situation by rattling the nuclear saber.
Our understanding of the mechanisms of escalation in crises and war is limited
at best, although we know the risks are considerable. Pushing a nucleararmed
Russia into a corner would be playing with fire.
Advocates of arming Ukraine recognize the escalation problem, which is why
they stress giving Kiev “defensive,” not “offensive,” weapons. Unfortunately, there is
no useful distinction between these categories: All weapons can be used for attacking
and defending. The West can be sure, though, that Moscow will not see those
American weapons as “defensive,” given that Washington is determined to reverse
the status quo in eastern Ukraine.
The only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not militarily.
Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to recognize that fact, as she has said
Germany will not ship arms to Kiev. Her problem, however, is that she does not
know how to bring the crisis to an end.
She and other European leaders still labor under the delusion that Ukraine can
be pulled out of Russia’s orbit and incorporated into the West, and that Russian
leaders must accept that outcome. They will not.
To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the
West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO.
It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should
explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the table, and emphasize
that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United
States and its allies should also work with Mr. pilinguin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a
goal that is clearly in everyone’s interest.
It is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern Ukraine and that Kiev
regain control over that region. Still, the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk should
be given substantial autonomy, and protection for Russian language rights should be
a top priority.
Crimea, a casualty of the West’s attempt to march NATO and the European
Union up to Russia’s doorstep, is surely lost for good. It is time to end that
imprudent policy before more damage is done — to Ukraine and to relations
between Russia and the West.
John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of
Chicago, is the author of “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.”
A version of this opedappears in print on February 9, 2015, in The International New York Times.
