Cablegate: Apuntes geoestratégicos

Starkiller · 30 Nov 2010

Estos días, gradualmente, van saliendo los cablegates. A mi, que me va esto de la geoestrategia, los considero informaciones interesantes, aunque nada rompedor. Independientemente de su origen, teorías conspiratorias, etc..., quiero ir posteando en este hilo algunas citas interesantes de los cablegates que van saliendo, junto con algunos comentarios míos. Para ello, reservare unos cuantos post de la primera página (Y que no me pase como con la Unificación, que me quedé sin sitio).

Aviso que estas selecciones son, evidentemente, según mi criterio. Que no son especialmente interesantes. Que comparten mi visión de las cosas, y que no es más que una especie de "trabajo de campo" en base a mis intereses y visión.

Para más referencias a esos intereses y visión, remito a estos hilos:

http://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliari...cion-de-europa-y-que-va-pasar-con-espana.html

http://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliaria/burbuja-inmobiliaria/146604-el-dolar-insumergible-reloaded.html

EDIT:

Amazon le ha cerrado el servicio AWS, EveryDNS e EasyDNS por miedo a
recibir DDoS han anulado sus zonas DNS.

Por principio, todos los que tengáis zonas de DNS bajo vuestro control,
podéis añadir estos registros:

wikileaks IN A 213.251.145.96
wikileaks IN A 46.59.1.2
wikileaks IN A 88.80.13.160

Por lo tanto, para que los links funcionen, es posible que tengáis que cambiar el dominio por alguno, como wikiberia.org

Ahora, sin más preámbulos, algunas cosas cogidas de los cablegates liberados el 28 y 29 de Noviembre:

Aqui vemos la relación entre China y USA, mucho más cordial de lo que muchos quieren vender:

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BEIJING1176.html

Jeje, por lo que sea, este ya no está. Aquí esta el link en la caché de google: http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...ikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BEIJING1176.html

Como parece que han quitado el cable de la base de datos, pongo aqui el link al post de este mismo hilo donde figura, completo: http://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliaria/3542991-post14.html

09BEIJING1176 2009-04-30 13:01 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Beijing

¶8. (C) In the first two G-20 Financial Summits, U.S. and Chinese positions had been close, closer even than the United States and Europe, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted. Views on major issues such as the need for fiscal stimulus and reform of international financial institutions were similar. Leading up to the London Summit, XXXXXXXXXXXX felt that the U.S.-U.K.-China “troika” had been effective: Beijing could persuade the developing countries, Washington could influence Japan and South Korea, and London could bring along the Europeans.

Aquí, que nadie se sorprenda, cuenta la idea de china acerca de la unificación de korea: China aboga por una Korea unificada bajo Seul. ¿Sorpresa? No debería de serlo si se ve bajo la luz de que China, realmente, es aliada de USA.

Cable Viewer

10SEOUL272 2010-02-22 09:09 2010-11-29 21:09 SECRET Embassy Seoul

¶1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea’s collapse ***owing the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North’s economy. Beijing had “no will” to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang’s policies -- and the DPRK characterized as “the most incompetent official in China” -- had retained his position as chief of the PRC’s 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador’s point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

Este es del 2007, pero ya se ve como China pide ayuda de inteligencia a USA para evitar que Iran y Korea del Norte compartan teconología:

Cable Viewer

07STATE152317 2007-11-03 05:05 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Secretary of State

¶1. (S) URGENT ACTION REQUEST: IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR
MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT
BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS
RELATING TO THE ONGOING tras*SHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY
BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT
HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON
NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME-
SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT tras*SHIPMENT. IN
ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL
POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.

Relaciones entre Francia y Rusia:

Cable Viewer

10STATE13750 2010-02-17 03:03 2010-11-29 12:12 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State

¶11. (S/NF) Audibert began by stating that France was taking
pragmatic approach to Russia, but that President Sarkozy had a
"problem of confidence" and did not fully trust Russia.
Audibert said Russia's two treaty proposals on new European
Security Architecture were unacceptable and mere provocations,
but that the French position was to use the proposals to
engage the Russians on new approaches to crisis management,
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, and on the
adoption of the Open Skies/verification measures. However, he
noted, these issues will continually be bogged down over the
situation in Georgia, which Audibert saw as intractable as
Russia will never "derecognize" the sovereignty of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia while also never recognizing Georgian
sovereignty over its territory, including the two enclaves.

Tendencias el nuevo (en el 2009) ministro de exteriores alemán (elegido justamente por sus lazos con Rusia):
Cable Viewer

09BERLIN1162 2009-09-18 16:04 2010-11-28 18:06 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Berlin

WESTERWELLE'S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
---------------------------------------

¶3. (C) Westerwelle's most important foreign policy
priorities will be focused on global disarmament and arms
control. In remarks in Schwerin on September 17, Westerwelle
called again for the removal of all U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons -- within the context of negotiations with NATO --
from German soil. He was very critical of the Bush
Administration's Missile Defense plans but was quick to
praise President Obama's recent announcement on Missile
Defense, saying "this move created additional international
confidence." Westerwelle remains a committed
tras*atlanticist but he has been consistently cautious of
committing German troops to out-of-area deployments.
Afghanistan was the exception. Westerwelle continues to
support Germany's ISAF mandate, but he has also indicated
that the FDP wants to bring German troops home from
Afghanistan as soon as possible provided the mission has been
successfully completed. Westerwelle and the FDP support
close engagement with Russia and see it as a "strategic
partner. Westerwelle has pursued close ties with Russia's
leadership during his eleven years in opposition. On Iran,
Westerwelle has talked about the need for dialogue but his
party's pro-business orientation makes him particularly
skeptical of sanctions and resistant to unilateral efforts to
cut back trade.

Rusia quitando hierro a lo de korea:

Cable Viewer

10STATE17263 2010-02-24 22:10 2010-11-28 18:06 SECRET Secretary of State

¶1. (S) A U.S. interagency team -- lead by ISN Acting
Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen -- met with a Russian
interagency team lead by Vladimir Nazarov, Deputy Secretary
of the Russian National Security Council (full participants
list is provided in paragraphs 76-77 below), on December 22,
2009 for a second round of discussions on a Joint Threat
Assessment (JTA), as agreed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev
in the 2009 U.S.-Russia Summit Joint Statement on Missile
Defense Issues. The Russian delegation came prepared to
engage seriously, and made presentations on their evaluation
of the missile programs of Iran and the DPRK; a conceptual
framework for evaluating the risk posed by various missile
programs; Russian concerns about instability in Pakistan and
the security of nuclear weapons and missiles there; and the
work of the FSB (Federal Security Service) in countering
efforts by Iranian and North Korean agencies to either obtain
nuclear and missile technologies and materials in Russia or
to tras*ship the
m through Russian territory. While the Russians were
prepared for discussions of cooperation at a strategic level
on countering missile proliferation, their position remained
the same: in their analysis, the missile programs of Iran and
the DPRK are not sufficiently developed, and their intentions
to use missiles against the U.S. or Russia are nonexistent,
thus not constituting a "threat" requiring the deployment of
missile defenses. The discussions included a vigorous
exchange of questions and answers, and concluded with an
invitation by the Russians to hold the next round of the JTA
in Moscow in March or April 2010. The discussions lasted the
full day. End Summary.

Continuo metiendo algo de info, esta vez de la liberada el 30/Nov, que dedican unas cuantas cosas a España.

Este cablegate lo cito fundamentalmente, para futura referencia acerca de atlantistas y no-atlantistas. Desde el punto de vista interior, hay a quien le puede resultar muy interesante, acerca de Fungairiño y como le ven desde USA:

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06MADRID293.html

06MADRID293 2006-02-03 14:02 2010-11-30 12:12 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Madrid

SUBJECT: SPAIN: CHIEF PROSECUTOR FORCED TO QUIT

¶1. (U) Attorney General Candido Conde Pumpido forced the
Chief Prosecutor of Spain's National Court, Eduardo
Fungairino, to step down for alleged mismanagement of
terrorism cases under his supervision. Fungairino, a
highly-respected 26-year veteran of the National Court, will
move to a position with the Supreme Court and retain a role
in terrorism cases. Fungairino's deputy, Jesus Santos, will
take over duties as Chief Prosecutor, at least on until a
successor is named. Conde Pumpido remonstrated Fungairino
for failing to secure Supreme Court confirmation of the
sentences of al-Qa'ida members convicted in September 2005
(thus allowing two terrorists to exit prison after having
served only half of their sentences) and for failing to push
for the completion of the 2004 Madrid train bombing
investigation. However, Fungairino's supporters claim that
the Zapatero government removed Fungairino because of his
strong opposition to a negotiated settlement with ETA,
negotiations that may require the cooperation of the National
Prosecutor's office.

[...]

//EARLY RELEASE OF CONVICTED TERRORISTS//

¶3. (U) The main failure cited by Conde Pumpido - the early
release of convicted terrorists - is troubling, but
responsibility for the issue rests with several actors.
Under Spanish law, a detainee must be released after serving
half their maximum prison term if the sentences have not been
confirmed by the Supreme Court. The problem in this instance
is that many of the detainees in the Barakat Yarkas case were
held in pre-trial detention for nearly four years, time that
counts towards their sentences. Since many of those
convicted received jail terms of eight or fewer years (see
full listing in para 5), the half-way point came nearly
immediately after their September 2005 convictions, giving
the notoriously slow Spanish legal system little time to win
confirmation of the convictions by the Supreme Court. It was
up to both the Prosecutor's office and the Supreme Court to
shuttle the cases through, and they failed to do so in time
to prevent the release of two al-Qa'ida cell members. The
government is expected to move quickly now to prevent further
releases.

//COMMENT//

¶4. (SBU) The Embassy has enjoyed a close, collaborative
relationship with Fungairino for many years. While it is
true that he sometimes seemed to have difficulty delegating
responsibility, he was also seen as a key leader by many
Spanish prosecutors and a brilliant legal strategist. It
appears that his personal and political differences with
Conde Pumpido were the main cause of his removal, though the
inability to prevent the early release of the terrorist
convicts is difficult to defend. Regardless of the political
motives surrounding Fungairino's removal, his departure will
hurt U.S.-Spain judicial cooperation, at least in the short
term. Fungairino was a devoted anti-terrorism activist who
pursued close cooperation with the USG and with EU allies in
terrorism cases. One piece of good news is that Fungairino
will reportedly remain a member of the U.S.-Spain Bilateral
Counterterrorism Experts Working Group, where he has played a
positive role in smoothing over conflicts generated by
differences in the U.S. and Spanish judicial systems. Also,
Jesus Santos, Fungairino's temporary replacement, is well and
favorably known to the Embassy. However, this does not
outweigh the loss of so valuable an interlocutor in the
National Prosecutor's office.

También dejo referencia a este cablegate. No lo cito, porque todo es mediánamente interesante. Habla de las relaciones de defensa, es un informe completo, de interés medio:

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07MADRID911.html

1 de Diciembre de 2010:

De 2006, con Strauss Kahn como candidato del Partido Socialista. Este hombre tiene grandes vínculos y es muy amigo de Washington. Es revelador ver como al conclusión del análisis es que es capaz técnicamente, pero esencialmente débil políticamente. Ambos (Lazos con Washington y ser fácilmente manipulable) ingredientes claves, parece ser, para ser un buen Presidente del FMI, parece ser.

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06PARIS3360.html

06PARIS3360 2006-05-19 07:07 2010-12-01 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Paris

¶18. (C) DSK was lively and engaging, full of good humor, and
remarkably modest and without pretensions. That may prove to
be his undoing. While he was openly critical of Royal, he
also readily admitted that she was doing many things right.
And while he clearly viewed himself as the right man to lead
France, he seemed reluctant to beat his own drum and was
spare with pre******ions about what he would do if chosen to
be France's next president. The impression left was that,
while he may be the most capable and qualified candidate
among the Socialists, he lacks the fire in the belly that
would propel him to victory. He is one of those who would
clearly be better governing than campaigning -- and therefore
may never get the chance to govern.

Este es bastante interesante, no por el tema (Una de las cargas de Garzón contra cargos de USA), sino por las connotaciones del análisis final. Curioso por parte del Antiamericano gobierno de ZP, el que retiro las tropas de irak y no se levantó antes la bandera, ¿Verdad? Como se ve que ante el poder de los Socialistas mas europeístas, otros socialistas (ZP entre ellos) temen verse arrinconados, y se acercan al Tio Sam. Esto es de mediados del año pasado:

09MADRID392 2009-04-17 06:06 2010-12-01 12:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Madrid

Despite the pro forma public comment of First Vice President Fernandez de la Vega that the GOS would respect whatever decision the courts make in this matter, the timing could not be worse for President Zapatero as he tries to improve ties with the U.S. and get the Spanish public focused on the future of the relationship rather than the past. That said, we do not know if the government would be willing to take the risky step of trying behind the scenes to influence the prosecutor’s recommendation on this case or what their reaction to such a request would be. CHACON

Otra interesante, sobre Garzón. Pongo el resumen, pero el cable se extiende bastante más, aparte de haber otros sobre el mismo tema. Esto es de mediados del 2009, menos de un año después Garzón fue suspendido. ¿Puede verse como una especie de "favor" del gobierno hacia USA para ganarse su favor? Es difícil saberlo, la verdad. Podría ser, pero esto es solo una idea de trabajo lanzada al aire, nada tan obvio como otras cosas.

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09MADRID440.html

09MADRID440 2009-05-05 15:03 2010-12-01 12:12 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Madrid

¶4. (SBU) We believe Zaragoza is acting in good faith and playing a constructive role. Certainly he knows Garzon better than we do, having sparred with him before. Nevertheless, we do not share his optimism that this problem will go away anytime soon. Having started, it is hard for us to see why the publicity-loving Garzon would shut off his headline-generating machine unless forced to do so. And forcing him to do so could take months. We also antiestéticar Garzon -- far from being deterred by threats of disciplinary action -- may welcome the chance for martyrdom, knowing the case will attract worldwide attention. In any event, we will probably be dealing with this issue for some time to come. Zaragoza will be in Washington in early June for LEGATT-organized consultations on CT cooperation. L and DOJ may wish take that opportunity to discuss these cases with him directly at that time. CHACON

De Folken90:

Cable de la embajada de Madrid sobre la opinión de España del Gobierno argentino · ELPAÍS.com

16. (C) We were especially struck by the emphasis Bernardino
Leon laid on cooperation with the U.S. in Latin America. His
move from MFA to the Presidency is rumored to have been
prompted by Zapatero's dissatisfaction with the func-tio-ning
of his first-term foreign policy apparatus. Reportedly his
"odd man out" experience at the NATO Summit in Bucharest was
the last straw. Leon is a credible player on foreign affairs
and well-disposed towards the U.S. Having him in a key
position at the Presidency bodes well as does the resonance
of Spanish views with our own on most things Latin American.
Cuba will continue to be the exception, at least when it
comes to tactics, but on a great many other important issues
in the Western Hemisphere we believe Spain is genuinely
interested in working with the U.S. and highly values A/S
Shannon's continuing attention. Aznar remains well-briefed
on Latin America, knows the players, and frequently travels
to the region, all good reasons for U.S. officials to stay in
touch with him.
Llorens

Todavía tienen en cuenta a Aznar para algo.

Y les encanta tener al Bernardino León ése (me hace gracia porque es la obsesión de algunos conspiranoias de los Bildeberg y demás) en una "posición clave en la presidencia por su predisposición a los USA".

Vaya, que están encantados de tener a los de asuntos exteriores de España a su servicio y a un tío del círculo íntimo de ZP.

Interesante también que los usanos den cŕedito a los rumores de que ZP estaba a disgusto con su política exterior en la primera legislatura

2 de Diciembre de 2010:

Relaciones entre Rusia e Italia: muy intersante

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09ROME97.html

09ROME97 2009-01-26 11:11 2010-12-02 14:02 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Rome

¶2. (C/NF) Summary. Italy's relationship with Russia is
complex, encompassing historical ideological sympathies,
geostrategic calculations, commercial pressure, energy
dependence, and personal relationships between top leaders.
The combination of these factors creates a strong tendency
for Italy's foreign policy to be highly receptive to Russian
efforts to gain greater political influence in the EU and
to support Russia's efforts to dilute American security
interests in Europe. In its relationship with Russia, energy
is the most important bilateral issue and the quest for
stable energy supplies from Russia frequently forces
Italy to compromise on security and political issues.
A not insignificant concomitant factor is PM
Berlusconi's desire to be seen as an important
European player on foreign policy, leading him to
go where others dare not. End summary.

Esta es sobre berlusconni y Rusia. También interesante:

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10MOSCOW266.html

10MOSCOW266 2010-02-05 10:10 2010-12-02 14:02 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Moscow

¶1. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us during a February 4 lunch that his Embassy and his Foreign Ministry often only learn of conversations between PM Berlusconi and PM pilinguin after the fact, and with little detail or background. He expressed frustration about the PMs’ “direct line,” which sometimes leaves the Embassy in the dark. He said if there is action to be taken, the cabinet secretary will instruct the Foreign Ministry or the Embassy without providing any background, and only note that Berlusconi and pilinguin had agreed on whatever the action item is. XXXXXXXXXXXX explained that while the close relationship is not ideal from the bureaucracy’s perspective and more detrimental than beneficial, it can be useful at times. He cited the case of the sale to Gazprom by Italian energy giant ENI of its 20% share in Gazprom’s oil subsidiary Gazpromneft. He said Gazprom had insisted on paying far below the market price, but that it ultimately paid the market price after Berlusconi weighed in with pilinguin.

3 de Diciembre de 2010:

Paso de citar nada concreto. Un montón de cosa de nivel confidencial hablando de lo pimpollo que es aznar con el tema del 11M y de los malos que son los antiamericanos sociatas.

Aqui tenéis un link funcional que he localizado, por si os quereis aburrir un rato: http://wikileaks.0z0ne.com/reldate/2010-12-03_0.html

PS: único dato útil: que en efecto, parece que esto va destinado a destapar/cargarse atlantistas, desde luego. Pero merecería ver los cables que pueda haber secretos (aunque seguramente serían Top Secret, o Ultra) especulando sobre el 11M...

Starkiller · 30 Nov 2010